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HASKER ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
Rod Bertolet

This paper disputes two arguments William Hasker gives against the doctrine
of middle knowledge in his book God, Time, and Knowledge. Hasker argues
that middle knowledge cannot ground counterfactuals of freedom, and that
the standard account of counterfactuals is inapplicable to counterfactuals of
freedom. I maintain that the first argument is quite inconclusive, and that the
second is wrong to deny that the standard semantics for counterfactuals
applies to counterfactuals of freedom. I further suggest that reliance on the
standard semantics for such counterfactuals is not something that the proponents of middle knowledge need accept.

I wish to question two of the arguments against the doctrine of middle knowledge that William Hasker offers in his book God, Time, and Knowledge. l My
purpose is not to defend middle knowledge, but rather to suggest that these
arguments are not compelling against that view. The arguments in question
are not the only ones Hasker gives, so I will not be discussing his full case
against middle knowledge. But as Hasker himself points out, all of the arguments are important:
... it is clear that in a controversy as heated as this one, it is a merit and not
a defect to assemble multiple independent arguments for the same conclusion;
a single argument, even if apparently unimpeachable, is too likely to be
treated with suspicion when it contravenes strong inclinations. 2

It is important, then, to know whether these arguments carry any force, even

if they do not exhaust Hasker's criticisms.

I. Middle Knowledge
What would it be to have middle knowledge? As Hasker formulates it, the
doctrine is tha t
for each possible free creature that might exist, and for each possible situation
in which such a creature might make a free choice, there is a truth,
known to God prior to and independent of any decision on God's part,
concerning what definite choice that creature would freely make if placed in
that situation. 3

Middle knowledge would be handy for God to have, because it offers risk-free
creation without the subordination of human wills to causal determinism.
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Knowing what you would do if you were to exist and find yourself in various
circumstances, God could choose whether to create you and your compatriots
depending on whether the upshot suited his purposes. If divine foreknowledge
and freedom are, despite what Hasker insists throughout his book, compatible, then middle knowledge provides a powerful account of how it is that
God can know what your future free acts will be.
Such knowledge would be knowledge of what Hasker, following recent
usage, calls counterfactuals of freedom. What is distinctive about the contemporary theory of middle knowledge, as rediscovered by Alvin Plantinga,4
is its reliance on the semantic analysis of counterfactuals in terms of possible
worlds, an analysis unavailable for the 16th Century version of the theory.
As Hasker notes,
the central idea of this semantics is that a counterfaclual is true if some
possible world in which the antecedent and the consequent are both true is
more similar to the actual world than any in which the antecedent is true and
the consequent false. 5

While I shall come to criticize Hasker for undue reliance on this analysis, I
shall assume it for the time being.
Although Hasker does not set his arguments out in this fashion, they may
be regarded as posing a dilemma for the theory of middle knowledge. True
counterfactuals of freedom would have to be either contingent or necessary.
Hasker argues that if we take them to be contingent, we find that they are
not grounded in anything. But if they are necessary, they are not counterfactuals of freedom. So either way, they are dubious creatures, of no use to the
theory of middle knowledge. In section II, I will challenge Hasker's claim to
have shown that such propositions are ungrounded if contingent. In section
III, I will attempt to show that his argument that such propositions must be
necessary if the theory of middle knowledge is true fails. If I am right about
this, Hasker has not shown that true counterfactuals of freedom are anything
but perfectly respectable, adequately grounded contingent truths: no dilemma
emerges from these arguments.

II. The Ground of Counterfactuals of Freedom
Hasker's first objection to the theory of middle knowledge is that it cannot
answer the question of what the ground of the truth of counterfactuals of
freedom is-what it is that makes counterfactuals of freedom true. 6 Plantinga,
perhaps unintentionally echoing a view to be found in Suarez, seems to hold
that it is simply "an ultimate fact about the agent in question that, if placed
in the indicated circumstances, she would act as the counterfactual states," a
fact that "requires no analysis or 'grounding' in terms of further, noncounterfactual states of affairs. "7 Hasker claims that this runs afoul of the
intuition that
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In order for a (contingent) conditional state of affairs to obtain, its obtaining
must be grounded in some categorical state of affairs. More colloquially, truth
about "what would be the case ... if' must be grounded in truths about what
is in fact the case. 8

Hasker suggests this is the case for material and causal conditionals-think
for instance of explaining what makes it true that a pane of glass is fragile
in terms of facts about its microstructure. This is plausible, but the analysis
of causal conditionals is controversial: Lewis analyzes causation in terms of
counterfactual dependence between events. 9 With this in mind-for that matter without this in mind-I suggest that Hasker's insistence that some categorical state of affairs must underlie the truth of a counterfactual is not very
persuasive. While Hasker is not entirely explicit about how the argument
proceeds, if it is to avoid assuming the point at issue it must first move from
his claims about material and causal conditionals to the generalization that
all conditional states of affairs must be grounded in categorical states of
affairs, and then from this generalization to the conclusion that counterfactuals of freedom must be grounded in this way. While the second step seems
safe enough, the first is far from assured. Even if we set aside the prevalent
scepticism about whether material conditionals are genuine surrogates for any
'if-then' statements, the controversy over the proper analysis of causal conditionals, and the fact that Plantinga and those who share his views do not
have the slightest inclination to accept the relevant generalization about conditional states of affairs, the first inference is certainly not irresistible. Generalizing about all conditionals from facts about material and causal
conditionals seems unduly hasty, and the support for such a generalization
seems correspondingly weak. When we turn to counterfactuals of freedom,
insisting that the truth of what I would do if I were relieved of my position
by the governor be grounded in what is in fact the case seems a bit too much
like-I do not say just like-demanding that we offer truth conditions for
alethic modalities solely in terms of what is in fact the case, without recourse
to the truth value of statements in possible worlds distinct from the actual
world. That can't be done; but this merely shows the constraint to be unreasonable-and it may be equally unreasonable to insist that counterfactuals of
freedom be grounded in truths about what is in fact the case. While I don't
find Plantinga's ultimate and unanalyzable facts very satisfying, I do not think
that Hasker's rejection of them has been sustained in a compelling fashion.
In discussion, Hasker allowed that this sort of complaint would be in order
if he "had claimed to conclusively settle the controversy on the basis of this
intuition," but that this misrepresents his intent. He maintains that his intention was rather to "cite the intuition as one which holds considerable weight
for me and, I would suppose, for a number of other philosophers as well. "10
Further, "if a philosopher finds little or no force in the appeal, it would be
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fatuous to assume she must yield to the intuition just because it seems compelling to me." I certainly do not wish to question Hasker's account of what
he intended to be doing in offering these considerations, but I think the reader
may be forgiven for taking a different view of what these were. The argument
in question appears in a section entitled "Objections to Middle Knowledge,"
and Hasker notes before giving the argument that if the discussion is to be
advanced by opponents of middle knowledge, "more substantial arguments
are needed [and] are available."11 This does not prepare one to expect that
the 'first argument' is really autobiographical in nature, not even if the lives
of others are demonstrably similar. My point is that if the argument is as weak
as I claim, it is not at all convincing, and hence not particularly substantial.
Hasker does explicitly indicate that he does not regard the argument as decisiveY But he also suggests, by the phrase "more substantial arguments," that
he hopes to take us beyond the "general considerations of plausibility" on
which many opponents of middle knowledge rely.13 This is something that I
submit he has not done with this argument. That counterfactuals of freedom
are contingent is, so far as these considerations go, still a live possibility.
With this in mind, let us pursue the question of the ground of counterfactuals of freedom a little further. The fault of a position like Plantinga's,
Hasker insists, is that it cannot provide a noncounterJactual ground for counterfactuals of freedom. Why are Plantinga and other proponents of middle
knowledge so unperturbed by this failure? Consider what Plantinga has to
say, by way of analogy, about the ground of his freely performing action A
yesterday:
What was or is it that grounded or founded my doing so? I wasn't caused to
do so by anything else; nothing relevant entails that I did so. So what grounds
the truth of the proposition in question? Perhaps you will say that what
grounds its truth is just that in fact I did A. But this isn't much of an answer;
and at any rate the same kind of answer is available in the case of Curley.
For what grounds the truth of the counterfactual, we may say, is just that in
fact Curley is such that ifhe had been offered a $35,000 bribe, he would have
freely taken it. 14

This is again the unanalyzable 'counterfactual fact' about Curley that Hasker
finds dissatisfying. But what is the answer to Plantinga's question about the
ground of the proposition that he freely did A yesterday? We cannot explain
this in terms of the "character, psychological tendencies, and the like of the
agent"15 without lapsing into causal determinism, and we cannot explain it
by appeal to God's doings without lapsing into theological determinism.
Given those limitations, what can we say about the ground of the proposition
that Plantinga did A freely yesterday? My suggestion is that Plantinga's remarks and the libertarian view that Hasker presupposes are cotenable. Hasker
disagrees; in discussion he insisted that the ground of the proposition in
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question "is simply the event of his doing A yesterday. "16 He added, correctly,
that no such event grounds counterfactuals of freedom.
I'm afraid that I agree with Plantinga that this isn't much of an answer. It
certainly isn't, and on a libertarian theory cannot be, much like our answer
to the question of why the pane of glass is fragile. As Hasker conceded,
"it's perfectly true that libertarian free will involves choices which lack
sufficient causes and are thus in some sense 'ungrounded' -though not, let
me point out, unmotivated."l7 I don't find Hasker's 'ground' of the proposition that Plantinga freely did A yesterday or Plantinga's 'ground' of the
proposition that Curley would have taken the bribe very satisfactory. But more
importantly, I don't see that one of these claims should disconcert me more
than the other. So I do not see that the grounding objection shows that
counterfactuals of freedom cannot be contingent. But Hasker next argues on
other grounds that they must, if the theory of middle knowledge is true, be
necessary.

III. The Modal Status of Counterfactuals of Freedom
Hasker's second (and novel) objection is that the theory of middle knowledge
gets the modal status of counterfactuals of freedom wrong, ruling them necessary when they ought to be contingent. If this argument is sound, it shows
that the proponents of middle knowledge have done themselves in, since the
counterfactuals in question will not be counterfactuals of freedom at all. So
it is a very serious objection. How does it run? When we consider conditionals
such as 'If David were to have stayed in Keilah, Saul would have besieged
the city,' much escapes our notice-there is a wealth of detail concerning the
facts about the world that goes unspecified. God, Hasker points out, is in a
quite different epistemic situation. "Surely, the antecedents of the conditionals he considers must include everything that might conceivably be relevant
to Saul's deciding one way or the other. "18 Hasker suggests that we understand
the conditional God considers as an initial-segment counterfactual, "in which
the antecedent specifies a complete initial segment of a possible world up to
a given point in time, and the consequent an event that mayor [may] not take
place at that time."19 Letting' A *' symbolize a proposition specifying the
entire initial segment of the possible world God considers as the one in which
Saul makes his decision about attacking the city, and using '>' as our counterfactual connective, we have
(10) A * > Saul besieges Keilah

and its contrary
(11) A * > Saul does not besiege Keilah.

We suppose that the first of these is true. But now what of its modal status?
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What would it take for it to be false at some other possible world, that is,
contingent? Hasker writes
The answer is that (10) might be false if the actual world were different than
it is; what is crucial is the similarity of envisaged possible worlds to the actual
world, and so if the actual world were a different world (in ways we need
not attempt to specify) than the one which is in fact actual, it might tum out
that the world specified in (11) would be more similar to that world than is
the world specified in (10), in which case (11) would be true and (10) false. 20

This is how Hasker thinks (10) might be false, but he argues that this little
story can't be told without violating "the fundamental idea that underlies the
possible-worlds semantics for counterfactuals. "21 This, because there is no
role for comparative similarity to play in assessing initial-segment counterfactuals.
The point of comparative similarity, Hasker maintains, is to fill in the gaps
in our knowledge of the worlds in question, and to clarify what would otherwise be an ambiguity in our counterfactuals. When we contemplate Lewis'
example, "If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over," are we to
consider relevant worlds in which these beasts have access to crutches, and
salvage their dignity in a tailless world by figuring out how to negotiate the
outback on those props? No, Lewis tells us, "Those worlds are too far away
from ours. What is meant by the counterfactual is that, things being pretty
much as they are-the scarcity of crutches for kangaroos being pretty much
as it actually is, the kangaroos' inability to use crutches being pretty much
as it actually is, and so on-if kangaroos had no tails they would topple
over. "22 The point of comparative similarity between worlds, Hasker claims,
"is to place limits on the worlds that are relevant for the evaluation of a given
counterfactual."23 This is correct-in part. Now, enter Hasker's objection:
But of course, (10) is already maximally limited in this way; it already
includes everything about the envisaged world up until the time when Saul
makes his decision. With regard to initial-segment counterfactuals, then, comparative similarity has no work left to do. 24

I have three criticisms of the way Hasker proceeds here. The first is that his
remarks do not clearly show anything about the modal status of (10). The
second is that he is wrong to resist the applicability of a theory such as Lewis'
to initial-segment counterfactuals. The third is that he is wrong to tie the
evaluation of counterfactuals to the Lewis-style comparative similarity theory
in the way he does in the first place. I shall develop these points in turn.

A. Modality
What does Hasker's claim that (10) is already maximally limited have to do
with the modal status of (1O)? Hasker continues,
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Ask yourself this question: In evaluating (10), why should it make a difference whether the actual world is as it is, or is a world different in various
ways from this one? After all, if A * were actual, then neither "our" actual
world nor that other one would be actual-so why should the truth of (10)
depend in any way on which of those worlds is actual as things now stand?25

We do not yet have the full force of Hasker's objection before us, but notice
that, at least as Hasker develops the point, this is the wrong question. What
Hasker claims he is going to show is that the theory of middle knowledge
gets the modal status of counterfactuals of freedom wrong, but what he asks
here is why the truth of (10) should depend on what the actual world is like.
On what does the modal status of a proposition turn? In the standard semantics for modal logic, (10) is contingent iff there is a standard model in which
there is a world w* such that wRw* (where w is the actual world) and (10)
is false at w*. We have as of yet not the slightest reason to think that there
is no such w* at which (10) is false. So far, then, we have no reason to think
that (10) is not contingent. 26
Suppose, though, that I am overlooking something here, and that Hasker
has asked the right question in wondering why the truth of (l0) should depend
in any way on which world is the actual world. There is, I think, a short and
adequate answer to this question: this is how minimal change possible worlds
semantics works-counterfactuals are evaluated in just the way Hasker indicated earlier, by determining whether the worlds in which the antecedent is
true and the consequent is false are less similar to the actual world than a
world in which both the antecedent and consequent are true. Hasker sharpened his objection to this line in discussion:
Well, sure-that's how it works, all right, but why does it work this way?
The semantics didn't just drop down from heaven, nor did it arrive by Federal
Express from one of Lewis' all-too-actual "possible worlds". There is a philosophical idea behind the semantics, the idea nicely captured by Lewis'
example of the tailless kangaroos. The idea is, that in constructing the set of
possible worlds relevant to evaluating the counterfactual, we make those
worlds as much as possible like the actual world, changed as little as possible
in order to make the antecedent of the counterfactual true. But when the
counterfactuals involved are initial-segment counterfactuals, the set of relevant possible worlds is already fully specified by the expressed antecedent
o/the counter/actual; the notion of comparative similarity to the actual world
has no further role to play.

In the next section, I shall argue that while Hasker is right about the determination of the set of relevant worlds, it is not true that comparative similarity
has no further role to play. Before moving on to that, though, it will be useful
to have Hasker's concise summary of what he takes the situation to be before us:
The theory of middle knowledge is obliged to hold that some initial-segment
counterfactuals are logically contingent. But in order to do this, the theory
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must apply to these counterfactuals the notion of comparative similarity to
the actual world, and I have argued that this notion has no legitimate application here-which is to say the notion is misapplied. The correct conclusion
to be drawn from counterfactual logic, then, is that if initial-segment counterfactuals are true at all, they are true in all worlds and thus are necessarily
true. But this conclusion is fatal to middle knowledge. 27

I have already expressed my doubts about whether Hasker's remarks pertain
to the modal status of initial-segment counterfactuals, as opposed to their
truth. However, I will continue to suppose for the sake of argument that I am
mistaken about this, and turn to a closer examination of the role of comparative similarity. First, I shall argue that Hasker is wrong to say that Lewis'
semantics does not apply to initial-segment counterfactuals, and hence that his
argument about the modal status of such propositions fails. Then I shall argue
that once we see why his argument fails, we can also see a way to establish that
his conclusion is true after all (given some important assumptions).

B. The Role(s) o/Comparative Similarity
Hasker's thesis about initial-segment counterfactuals is that Lewis' theory
does not apply to them, that it is misapplied if it is used for such counterfactuals, because there is "nothing for comparative similarity to do" in the
evaluation of them. Why is this? Because while ordinarily the antecedents of
counterfactuals leave much open, and so leave room for us to specify a set
of worlds relevant to the evaluation of the conditional, there is no such
latitude with initial-segment counterfactuals: there are, as Hasker says, no
gaps that we might fill in one way or another. I said earlier that Hasker is
right-in part-about the role of comparative similarity. It is critically important to recognize, however, that while Hasker always speaks of the role
of comparative similarity, it actually has two jobs. The first is to specify a
set of relevant worlds, excluding those that are too remote from the actual
world to matter. That task is preempted in the case of initial-segment counterfactuals, since the set of relevant worlds is, as Hasker says, completely
determined by their antecedents. This simply reflects the unusual nature of
initial-segment counterfactuals. The other task, reflected in Lewis' truth conditions, is to determine whether some world at which the antecedent and
consequent are both true is more similar to the actual world than any world
in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This task is not
preempted by the fact that the set of relevant worlds is determined in an
unusual way for initial-segment counterfactuals. So it does not follow, from
the fact that there is no work for comparative similarity to do in determining
the set of relevant worlds, that there is nothing for it to do at all. 28
Of course, when we come to answer the question of whether some world
in which the antecedent and consequent are true is more similar to the actual
world than any world in which the antecedent is true but the consequent is
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false, something odd happens. All A*-worlds are identical, up to the time of
the decision, since they include everything about the world's past history up
to the time when the decision was made. So, none is more similar to the actual
world than any other. (In saying this, I am joining Hasker in assuming that
the similarity of the A *-worlds does not turn on anything that happens after
the time of the decision, and that comparative similarity must be determined
without appeal to counterfactuals; these are assumptions whose merits will
be discussed at the end of this subsection. It is vitally important to keep in
mind that these assumptions are in place in evaluating what follows.)
But is the semantics misapplied because of this-do initial-segment counterfactuals "have a feature which contravenes the controlling idea of Lewis'
theory" and which therefore renders the theory inapplicable? I think not.
What we have is a set of relevant worlds all of which are equally similar to
the actual world. But Lewis' theory explicitly allows for such ties. This can
be seen both from the formal development of the theory and from some
remarks Lewis makes about a troublesome example. The comparative similarity system Lewis develops involves a weak ordering of worlds rather than
a strong ordering, which means that "ties are permitted: two different things
can stand in the relation to each other, and thus be tied in the ordering. "29 So
clearly the formal theory recognizes the possibility of ties among two (or
more) worlds. But it is also clear that for Lewis this is more than an abstract
possibility. Consider what he says about the following example.
A is "Bizet and Verdi are compatriots", F is "Bizet and Verdi are French", I

is "Bizet and Verdi are Italian". Grant for the sake of argument that we have
the closest F-world and the closest I-world; that these are distinct (dual
citizenships would be a gratuitous difference from actuality); and that these
are the two finalists in the competition for closest A-world. It might be that
something favors one over the other-for all I know, Verdi narrowly escaped
settling in France and Bizet did not narrowly escape settling in Italy. But we
can count on no such luck. The case may be perfectly balanced between
respects of comparison that favor the F-world and respects that favor the
I-world. 30

So the fact that comparative similarity does not rule some worlds in the set
of relevant worlds more similar to the actual world than others does not render
the theory inapplicable. (Notice that this suggests that Hasker's description
of the first role of comparative similarity being preempted may be unduly
pejorative: why not instead say that it is carried out effortlessly?) The fact
that all of Hasker's A *-worlds are equally similar to the actual world, then,
does not show that Lewis' theory is misapplied if it is used for initial-segment
counterfactuals. I conclude that Hasker's objection that the theory of middle
knowledge gets the modal status of initial-segment counterfactuals wrong
fails. But I shall now show that his conclusion can be derived from his
premises after all.

12

Faith and Philosophy

Suppose that there are A *-worlds in which it is true that Saul besieges
KeBah, and A *-worlds in which Saul does not besiege Keilah. (This is just
the supposition that (10) is contingent.) Now let us ask whether (10) is true.
While God has preempted our usual procedure for resolving vagueness, he
has fixed a set of relevant worlds, the A *-worlds, and who are we to argue?31
Is it the case that some world where A * and' Saul besieges the city' are both
true is more similar to the actual world than any world in which A * is true
and 'Saul besieges the city' is false? No! All the A*-worlds are equally similar
to the actual world.32 So quite straightforwardly, on Lewis' semantics, (10)
is false. By the same reasoning, (11) is also false. Indeed all initial-segment
counterfactuals are false if they are contingent. In one more step we arrive
at Hasker's conclusion, by contraposition. But we do so without claiming that
Lewis' theory is misapplied, and without any convoluted claims about what
would be the case if the actual world were different than it is.
We have however made and been operating under some crucial assumptions: first, that differences in worlds after the time of the decision do not
bear on comparative similarity. This assumption is not merely crucial but
controversial. It is clear from Lewis' discussion in "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow" that he regards this assumption as false. 33 I shall
not stray into the details here, but it is plain that his claims about the comparative similarity of the various sets of worlds he considers in reply to the
'future similarity objection' tum on features of those worlds subsequent to
the time of the antecedent of the conditional in question. 34 Other theories,
such as Bennett's, offer no favoritism of earlier over later times. 35 The point
is just this. Hasker gives no argument for this controversial assumption,
though he clearly makes it and has to make it. The dire consequences for
middle knowledge I have just reached by relying on it are no firmer than the
assumption itself (and I'm not at all sure that it is true).
The proponent of middle knowledge will, as a referee pointed out, likely
insist that it is worse than this, since I have also accepted Hasker's claim that
Plantinga is wrong to hold that one measure of comparative similarity involves the counterJactuals that a world shares with the actual world. 36 One
who sides with Plantinga on this issue will not be persuaded that it has been
shown that all the A*-worlds are equally similar to the actual world, since
we have not taken counterfactuals the A*-worlds share with the actual world
into accountY It should be noted that Hasker does argue against Planting a 's
position, insisting that similarity to the actual world must be based on noncounterfactual respects.38 The objection is, as he observes, closely related to
the 'grounding' objection, and I think that it stands or falls (hence, falls) with
that objection. So while Hasker's conclusion can be derived from his premises, the defender of the theory of middle knowledge is not likely to be moved
by the argument.

HASKER ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE

13

C. The Need/or Comparative Similarity
My final objection to Hasker's argument concerning initial-segment counterfactuals concerns its reliance on the comparative similarity theory. It is quite
true that Plantinga's version of the theory of middle knowledge, which is
Hasker's main target, relies on the assumption that the truth conditions of
counterfactual statements are to be given by appeal to claims about the comparati ve similarity of possible worlds, or minimal changes in the actual world.
But it is by no means clear that this analysis is required for counterfactuals,
and without it, the objection developed by appeal to initial-segment counterfactuals fails even if my preceding remarks are wrong and Hasker's argument
works against minimal change theories. Hasker seems to suppose that the
possible worlds analysis is the only game in town-he notes Alfred
Freddoso's suggestion that "we might wonder why it wasn't perfectly obvious
from the start that comparative similarity wouldn't help us if the conditionals
in question involve genuine causal indeterminism," but suggests that "getting
rid of the semantics ... eliminates a good deal of the theory's philosophical
substance. "39
But getting rid of 'the' semantics-getting rid of the possible worlds analysis, that is-need not leave us with just our gut feelings about counterfactuals. Igal K vart's 1986 theory seems to provide the sort of analysis of
counterfactuals the proponents of middle knowledge would welcome. I cannot go into the quite complex details of Kvart's theory here, due to space
limitations that have been imposed on this paper-but I shall try to describe
the salient features of the theory that suggest that it is well worth further
investigation.
The theory makes no appeal to possible worlds (though it has a possible
worlds description), but is grounded instead in objective conditional probabilities. 40 Objective conditional probabilities presumably reflect 'facts about
what is the case,' and so should be suitable for grounding counterfactuals
even by Hasker's standards. This means Kvart's approach is immune to the
grounding objection discussed in section II above. Kvart's theory is not equivalent to minimal-change theories such as Stalnaker's, Lewis', or Pollock's,41
and its application requires no judgment about the relative similarity of possible worlds. Hence it is not subject to Hasker's objection, discussed in
section III B, to minimal change theories. It is also not deterministic; K vart
quite explicitly sets out to provide a theory that is compatible with the libertarian view Hasker presupposes, one that applies to "counterfactuals whose
antecedents describe various human actions, decisions, etc. (when it is assumed that it was possible for the agent as of that time, to have acted otherwise). "42 Such an indeterministic theory is, after all, just what Freddoso
suggests. And finally, it is not interest-relative or context-dependent in the
way Lewis' theory is.43 In short, the theory seems to have all the features
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Hasker, as well as his opponents, regard as desirable, and none of the features
Hasker finds objectionable.
Of course, Kvart's advertisements for his theory may prove to be misleading under further scrutiny, and it may turn out that it will not be suitable for
understanding counterfactuals of freedom.44 But my point is that abandoning
the minimal change theory that appeals to similarity relations among possible
worlds may very well not have the consequences Hasker suggests. He worries
that "Those philosophers (their name is legion) who are disposed in any case
to be suspicious of counterfactuals can only have their suspicions confirmed
if we are deprived of any systematic account of their semantics. "45 It is
however simply false that giving up the minimal change theory would deprive
us of a systematic account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. If
Freddoso is right and it should have been perfectly obvious from the start
that comparative similarity will not help with conditionals involving genuine
causal indeterminism, perhaps it is a theory like Kvart's that assumes indeterminism that ought to be explored by the defenders of middle knowledge.
The question of whether they will find anything useful in this exploration is
one that I regard as open.

Purdue University
NOTES
I. Cornell University Press, 1989; hereafter abbreviated GTK. An earlier version of this
paper was presented to the Indiana Philosophical Association in April of 1990 as part of
a symposium on this book, with Hasker commenting. The present version contains what
survived Hasker's reply, and some additional thoughts it provoked. When I cite Hasker's
views 'in discussion,' I am quoting from a copy of his comments that he generously gave
me. I wish to acknowledge his helpful comments, and conversations with my colleagues
Bill Gustason and J. A. Cover. I am also indebted to very useful comments from two
referees and the editor.

2. GTK, p. 18. Hasker is here commenting on the apparent redundancy of arguing
against middle knowledge given that he is concerned to refute a view middle knowledge
presupposes, namely the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, but
the point has more general applicability.
3. GTK, p. 20.
4. See Ch. 9 of The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974).
5. GTK, p. 25. This is a little loose since (a) this characterizes only counterfactuals that
are nonvacuously true and (b) the world in question must be accessible from the actual
world. I will join Hasker in ignoring these niceties, however. For various fonnulations of
this sort of theory, see Rohert Stalnaker, "A Theory of Conditionals," in N. Rescher (ed.),
Studies in Logical Theory (Basil Blackwell, 1968); David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Harvard University Press, 1973); and John Pollock, Subjunctive Reasoning (D. Reidel, 1976).

HASKER ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE

15

6. GTK, p. 29.
7. GTK, p. 30.
8. GTK, p. 30.
9. In "Causation," reprinted in Philosophical Papers volume II (Oxford University
Press, 1986).
10. He goes on to quote Robert M. Adams' bewilderment about what sort of property
Plantinga is talking about, originalIy cited in GTK, p. 25. (See Adams, "Middle Knowledge
and the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), pp. 109-17.)
11. GTK, p. 29.
12. In his introductory remarks to the chapter on middle knowledge, he writes that "a
series of objections to this theory will be considered, leading up to one that I consider
decisive" (GTK, p. 19), and the argument under consideration is not that final argument.
13. I do not, by the way, wish to deny that the intuition provides a certain plausibility
to the denial of middle knowledge. I am not entirely unsympathetic to the view Hasker
takes here, but my concern is with whether his remarks have any further weight.
14. Plantinga, "Reply to Robert M. Adams," quoted in GTK, p. 30. As Hasker notes,
Plantinga is appealing to an example he gave in The Nature of Necessity. While Planting a
is right to pose this question about the ground of the proposition that he freely did A
yesterday, it might be even more interesting to ask what, according to Hasker, grounds the
truth of a proposition expressing an actual butfilture free act. Ifhe says that this is currently
not grounded, then it is unclear that there is any complaint to be made about counterfactuals of freedom. If it is instead claimed that such a proposition is now grounded, it needs
to be shown that whatever it is grounded in is not something to which a proponent of
middle knowledge might appeal. This point, which lowe to an anonymous referee,
requires further exploration, but I do not have the space to conduct it here.
15. GTK, p. 31.

16. I assume he meant the event of Plantinga's doing A freely yesterday, since one can
perform an act without performing it freely.
17. In discussion.
18. GTK, p. 32.

19. This move is itself at least somewhat dubious, though I won't rely on the point. Is
the day on which the last Brontasaurus expired, or the size of the polar ice cap on the day
of creation, even conceivably relevant to Saul's decision? I doubt it, chaos theory notwithstanding, and if it and other things are not relevant, then there is no reason to think that
the antecedent of the conditional God considers is that of an initial-segment counterfactual.

20. GTK, p. 33.
21. GTK, p. 33.
22. Lewis, Counterfactuals, pp. 8-9, quoted by Hasker on p. 34.

23. GTK, p. 34.
24. GTK, p. 34.
25. GTK, pp. 34-35.
26. One referee suggested that perhaps Hasker is asking the right question, since if it

16

Faith and Philosophy

is irrelevant which world is actual, (10) is arguably necessary. That may be-though it
would still need to be argued that it is irrelevant which world is actual-but this is not
how Hasker's argument proceeds. The suggested approach would be part of an attempt to
show that on the standard semantics, (10) is a necessary truth. But Hasker is, as we shall
see, using this claim to attempt to establish that the standard semantics is inapplicable,
because the notion of comparative similarity "has no legitimate application here" (GTK,
p. 35). So if Hasker is indeed posing the right question, it is not for the reason that he
offers. And however this may be, the ensuing discussion does not depend on my being
right about this point.

27. GTK, p. 35. One might wonder why, if the semantics is really misapplied, initialsegment counterfactuals come out true at all worlds rather than neglected or untreated by
the semantics-but since this point would not be of much use to the fans of middle
knowledge, I think we can ignore it.
28. Someone might object (since someone did) that there aren't really two separate
roles for comparative similarity, on the grounds that in fulfi1ling the second role, it
automatically fulfills the first, excluding from our interest those worlds which are too
remote from the actual world to matter. In the 'normal' cases, this is in fact how things
work: we do not first screen off Hasker's world "in which a large and active Animal
Friendship League was assiduously providing prosthetic devices for 'handicapped' animals" (GTK, p. 35) and its ilk and then determine whether a world in which antecedent
and consequent are both true is more similar to the actual world than the remaining ones
in which the antecedent holds but the consequent fails. But it does not follow that these
are not separable, logically independent roles for comparative similarity. 1 suggest that
both the results with initial-segment counterfactuals and Lewis' explicit al10wance for ties
in comparative similarity (discussed below in the text) show that they are in fact logically
independent. If the reader prefers to see them as two aspects of a single task, my point
still holds.
29. CounterJactuals, p. 48n.
30. "Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility," in Philosophical Papers volume II
(Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 06-07. This passage occurs in his objection to
Stalnaker's theory, which is why he is discussing the closest A -world here. But he declares
the sort of treatment I give of ties "reasonable enough" when he moves on to Analysis 2,
which does not require that there be a closest A-world, and that treatment is (1 argue below
in the text) what follows from Analysis 3, the one he endorses.
31. Again, I grant that the task of determining a set of relevant worlds has been
preempted, or perhaps executed with great ease, with initial-segment counterfactuals
because the set of relevant worlds is determined by the antecedent of the counterfactual.
What I am suggesting is that this in itself does not matter-it is due to the peculiarity of
initial-segment counterfactuals. Lewis' semantic analysis applies nonetheless, as I shall
now show.
32. Notice that initial-segment counterfactuals are not special in this regard. The same
result holds for the Bizet and Verdi counterfactuals, if the relevant worlds are all tied in
regard to similarity to the actual world.
33. In Philosophical Papers volume II; see pp. 43-48, especially the discussion of big
and little miracles.

HASKER ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE

17

34. See pp. 43-48.
35. See Jonathan Bennett, "Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction," The Philosophical Review 93 (1984), pp. 57-94.
36. See The Nature of Necessity, p. 178, and "Reply to Adams," noted on p. 35 of GTK.
37. It was also suggested that the argument depends on assuming that neither (10) nor
(11) is true, which would simply be assuming that the theory of middle knowledge is false.
This assumption would be hopelessly question-begging, but I do not see the need for it.
One need not insist that (10) and (11) are both false; one only needs to claim that it is not
legitimate to appeal to such counterfactuals in judging similarity of A *-worlds to the actual
world.
38. See GTK, pp. 35-36.
39. GTK, p. 39n. See note 43 below, however.
40. Igal Kvart, A Theory of Counterfactuals (Hackett, 1986). Counterfactuals are
initially reduced to what Kvart calls causal irrelevance and purely positive causal relevance, which are later done away with in favor of objective conditional probabilities. (And
despite the suspicion the appeal to causal factors may raise, he insists he presumes
indeterminism.)
41. See K vart, chapters 7 & 8, where proofs of this are offered.
42. Kvart, p. xii; see also pp. 31 and 70.
43. See K vart, pp. 186-89. I should say that the version of the minimal change theory
Plantinga and Hasker are discussing is also neither interest-relative nor context-dependent,
despite the fact that these are two of Lewis' favorite features of his theory, because the
proponents of middle knowledge can't live with this aspect of his theory. This departure
from Lewis requires (and perhaps can be given) some justification; K vart's theory does
not have these features to begin with.
44. One crucial question is whether Kvart's sense of "could have done otherwise" is
robust enough for the libertarian tastes Hasker and his Molinist opponents share. The fact
that the theory is avowedly indeterministic, and indeterministic precisely to accommodate
statements about human actions, strongly suggests that Kvart's "could" is not that of one
who thinks that free will and determinism can be reconciled. But we need to sift carefully
through the details of the theory, in a way that I cannot here, to be certain that this aim is
fulfilled.

45. GTK, p. 39n. In discussion, Hasker said that he did not mean to imply that there are
no alternative possibilities for the semantics of counterfactuals, and added that the proponents of middle knowledge have in fact not constructed such an alternative. Fair enough.
But I stand by the claim that his comments in his book seem to suggest this, and note that
even if the proponents of middle knowledge have not developed it, there is at least one
well-worked-out alternative to minimal change theories available.

